Peru this last week has been taken aback by the unexpected presidential election results. With the official count concluded on 16 April, Pedro Castillo, a rank outsider, made it to first place with 19.1% of valid votes against no less than 17 competitors. He was followed by Keiko Fujimori (13.4%), Rafael López Aliaga (11.7%), Hernando de Soto (11.6%), Yonhy Lescano (9.1%) and Verónika Mendoza (7.9%). Castillo and Fujimori therefore pass to a second round on 6 June.

Of equal significance was the 17.8% of voters who registered spoilt (null or void) ballot papers, over 3 million of them. Even at the end of the campaign, it was clear that a large proportion of the voting public had yet to make up their minds whom to vote for. It would seem that the result turned on what voters decided to do on the way to the polling booth. Many, evidently, felt unwilling to endorse any of the candidates. The ONPE calculates that a further 7.2 million potential voters (or nearly 30%) stayed away altogether.

The strong vote for Castillo was surprising. Although the final opinion polls published a week before 11 April suggested that his campaign was going well and growing fast, no-one predicted the scale of his support across the country. This was particularly strong in the highland regions of Peru, suggestive of the depth of animosity felt by voters there towards what we can call the ‘political class’ as well as the limeño elites.

Public alienation among the poorest voters has long been in evidence, but it can only have increased as a result of the evidence of rampant corruption in high places made clear over the last five years and, more recently by poor handling of the Covid-19 pandemic which has punished most the vulnerable and the poor. Social, ethnic and regional inequalities have all grown in Peru since the last election in 2016. Support for Castillo was consistently higher in the Andes than along the more prosperous coast and in Lima.

Support for Castillo seriously undermined that for Mendoza who, during the campaign, was among the front-runners. She veered towards the centre in the last weeks of campaigning, downplaying the more radical points on her agenda. This appears to have allowed her to grow in acceptance among the urban middle-class, but to have opened up space for Castillo among the most disaffected voters. Generally speaking, the manifesto of Perú Libre demands radical changes to the way in which Peru has been governed in recent years and an end to neoliberalism. The other main left-of-centre party, Marco Arana’s Frente Amplio received a punishing 0.5% of the vote.

The campaign appears to have led to a whittling down of support for centrist candidates. George Forsyth, the former mayor of La Victoria who had led the race over much of the last six months, found himself in eighth place with only 5.6% of the vote. And Lescano, who a week before the vote was still number one in the polls came in fifth. Even more notable was the vote for Julio Guzmán of the Partido Morado.

Castillo now faces a polarising second round left-right battle with Keiko Fujimori. On the face of it, Fujimori can count on the support given to other right-wing candidates, López Aliaga and Hernando de Soto among others. But some of those voting for López Aliaga may be attracted by Castillo’s equally conservative views on moral issues. Also, Fujimori remains one of the first-round candidates who elicits the most negative responses from potential voters in the opinion polls. The charges against her over illicit funding for her 2011 and 2016 election campaigns may hang like a millstone around her neck.

Inversely, many who were attracted to Castillo by his position on the economic and health situation, may be scared off by his radical proposals and lack of concrete proposals on such tangible issues as the Covid pandemic.

In common with previous second rounds since 2001, this will be a fresh contest, distinct from the first. For both contenders there is all to play for, most notably in convincing the voting public that they are the lesser of two evils (el mal menor). It was this that led otherwise improbable winners to victory: Alan García against Ollanta Humala in 2006, Humala against Keiko in 2011, and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski against Keiko in 2016.

The election was also an election for Congress. Here the results make for worrying reading in terms of bolstering Peru’s fragile democracy. The next Congress will be even more fragmented than its predecessor, with no less than ten parties represented, up from nine in the current legislature. Perú Libre will have the largest number of seats with 37 seats out of 130, Fuerza Popular 24, Acción Popular 17, Alianza por el Progreso 15, Renovación Popular 13, Avanza País 7, Juntos por el Perú 5, Podemos Perú 4, Somos Perú 4 and the Partido Morado 3. The names of the successful candidates and where they represent can be found here.

The lack of any majority will involve complex negotiations between parties and their leading figures in order to face up to the most basic tasks, like electing a steering committee (junta directiva).

This proliferation of parties would have been greater but for the so-called valla which means that parties receiving less than 5% of the vote are ruled out. However, the large numbers voting null and void in the congressional elections had the effect of bumping up the number of parties that passed the valla since this is measured against valid votes only. The number of null and void votes exceeded 30% in no less than eight regions.

Many of today’s existing parties will lose their official registration, including longstanding ones like the Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC).

The election, along with the partial reforms that preceded it, has done nothing to strengthen Peru’s chronically week party system. Parties remain merely electoral vehicles for their leaders. They have virtually no roots in society, thus failing in their basic function of representing people at the level of the state. Though members of Congress nominally represent different regions, this is a largely fictitious attachment.

As with its predecessors, large numbers of the newly elected members of Congress represent no-one but themselves or the specific interest groups to which they belong. Even recognisable parties like Acción Popular is highly factionalised. Parties in Congress thus will continue to be ill-disciplined entities among which politicians slip effortlessly from one party label to another.

How politics will work out after 28 July is hard to fathom, but problems of corruption and illegitimacy are set to persist. Not a great prospect.