Alan Garcia’s decision to extend diplomatic asylum to three former Bolivian ministers – wanted by the Morales government in relation to the enquiry into a massacre in 2003 – is not only a calculated snub to the Bolivian president but also a move that has domestic significance. The more Peru distances itself from Bolivia (and Venezuela) the more Garcia seeks to identify Ollanta Humala as a friend of Peru’s supposed foes.

The three Bolivian former ministers – Mirtha Quevedo, Jorge Torres Obleas and Javier Torres Goitia – were expected to attend a hearing in Sucre with respect to the role played by the whole cabinet in the killings that took place in El Alto in October 2003. Some 60 people lost their lives and many others were wounded when, on government orders, troops opened fire on local protestors seeking to stop fuel supplies reaching the capital. The Bolivian government has been seeking the extradition of the then president, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, from the United States so that he too would attend the hearing.

The extradition of the three Bolivians followed hard on the heels of Peru’s decision to offer asylum to Venezuelan Manuel Rosales, the mayor of Maracaibo, who – as opposition governor of Zulia state (2002-2004) – is alleged to have misappropriated 60 million dollars of public money. Rosales unsuccessfully challenged Hugo Chavez for the presidency in 2006. He claims that he would not have received a fair trial in Venezuela.

Ever since his election in 2006, Garcia has sought to distance himself from both Bolivia and Venezuela. During the election campaign, particularly in the build-up to his second round contest with Humala, Garcia sought to portray Humala as kow-towing to Caracas and acting as a tool of President Chavez’s foreign policy. He won valuable electoral support by seemingly standing up to unwarranted intervention by the Venezuelan leader in Peru’s election.

Since then, the Peruvian government has highlighted the presence of the so-called ‘Casas de ALBA’ on Peruvian soil, organisations that supposedly channel Venezuelan resources to opposition groups. The brouhaha over the Casas de ALBA has provided an ongoing opportunity to depict Humala as unpatriotic. The focus on supposed foreign interference also provides a pretext for questioning the motives of those who, like the Amazon indigenous groups (see pages 4-5), engage in direct action to protest against the government’s economic policies.

Garcia’s foreign and trade policies have sought to embrace the United States at the expense of its Andean partners. Portraying Peru as Washington’s most loyal ally in its conflict with Venezuela, Garcia won backing from the Bush administration for the signing of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), a powerful factor in Venezuela’s decision to leave the Andean Community (CAN). Since then, Peru has been a prime mover in persuading the European Union to negotiate a bilateral trade liberalisation agreement, notwithstanding opposition from Bolivia to this move. Bolivia, which opposes trade liberalisation, sees the EU as complicit in a ploy that threatens the unity of the CAN.

In response to expressions of anger by the Bolivian authorities over the decision to give sanctuary to the three former ministers, Peruvian Foreign Minister Jose Antonio Garcia Belaunde a few days ago accused Evo Morales of long harbouring “rancour” against Peru. According to Garcia Belaunde this is because Morales wants to exert leadership not just “over his own people but many others situated in the high Peruvian Andes”. That people in Puno (where voters opted overwhelmingly for Humala in 2006) feel frustrated with Lima, however, has much more to do with Lima than with La Paz.