In a recent article in El Comercio, “Canon: mucha plata, pocas nueces” (19 October 2026), Pablo de la Flor, former executive director of the Sociedad Nacional de Minería, Petróleo y Energía (SNMPE) and former senior executive at Minera Poderosa, offers a forceful critique of how Peru’s subnational governments use revenues from the mining canon and royalties. His argument is familiar, but the scale of the resources involved makes it particularly timely. With high mineral prices generating substantial transfers, Peru has another opportunity to turn mineral wealth into lasting development.
De la Flor’s diagnosis is difficult to dismiss. Between 2017 and 2025, he reports, the annual budget available to regional and municipal governments from mining revenues tripled, reaching 8.8 billion soles (US$2.6 billion), while average annual expenditure amounted to only 6 billion soles. Of every 100 soles municipalities allocated to projects, just 21 went to water, sanitation, education, health and electricity. He also highlights unfinished works, weak procurement and volatile revenues. These problems have been documented by researchers and oversight institutions for years.
The mining canon predates Peru’s current decentralisation arrangements. Its antecedents lie in efforts to return extractive revenues to producing territories, beginning with petroleum in the 1970s. The 2001 Canon Law consolidated the framework for distributing revenues from mining and other extractive activities, coinciding with Peru’s transition away from the centralised political system of the Fujimori years.
Under the mining canon, 50% of the income tax paid by mining companies is redistributed to subnational governments and public universities according to legally established criteria. The underlying principle is important: territories contributing to national mineral wealth should receive a share of the public revenues they generate. The canon was never simply a mechanism for financing construction projects. It also gave territorial expression to the distribution of national wealth.
Criticism has often concentrated on visible failures: poorly conceived monuments, unfinished roads and public works contributing little to local welfare. Corruption, political opportunism and inadequate technical preparation have compounded these problems. Yet experience has also produced institutional learning. Some local governments have improved their planning and implementation practices, while others struggle with shortages of qualified personnel, fragmented responsibilities and pressures from contractors and political interests. Treating all subnational governments as equally incapable obscures these differences.
De la Flor proposes strict conditions on canon expenditure: until governments achieve adequate standards in basic services, all their canon revenues should be directed towards closing those gaps. Implementation could be entrusted to larger administrative arrangements, central government ministries or mechanisms such as Obras por Impuestos (whereby mining companies undertake projects in return for reduced taxation). He also proposes stabilisation funds to smooth revenue fluctuations.
His approach raises a fundamental question. Is reform primarily about ensuring that local governments spend on centrally determined priorities, or enabling territories to govern their own development more effectively? These objectives need not be incompatible, but they are different. The first concentrates on expenditure and compliance; the second requires institutions capable of making decisions, negotiating priorities, implementing projects and accounting for results.
De la Flor has previously recognised the importance of strengthening subnational capacities. In a 2022 article on the failure of decentralisation, he advocated clearer responsibilities, stronger administrative capabilities and more predictable transfers. Yet substituting external agencies for weak local administrations may deliver projects without strengthening the institutions responsible for managing public affairs afterwards. It risks solving an immediate implementation problem while perpetuating the underlying weakness.
There is also a distinction between identifying deficits in public services and deciding how a territory should develop. Water, sanitation, health and education are essential, but development also depends on roads, irrigation, markets, environmental management and productive infrastructure. Priorities vary between territories. A uniform national hierarchy of expenditure risks overlooking the relationships that determine whether investments produce lasting benefits.
Nor should unspent resources automatically be equated with wasted resources. Low execution frequently reflects inadequate project preparation, cumbersome procurement and poor coordination. These failures require correction, but spending everything immediately is not necessarily desirable when mineral revenues are finite.
De la Flor’s stabilisation proposal could be taken further. Stabilising annual budgets and saving for future generations serve distinct purposes. The former protects investment against revenue fluctuations; the latter converts temporary mineral income into lasting assets. The larger question is how much of today’s mining income should build the economic, human and institutional capabilities on which territories will depend after extraction ends.
What matters, therefore, is not simply whether money is spent, but what remains afterwards. Water systems require maintenance and trained operators; schools need qualified teachers; productive infrastructure requires skills, institutions and markets. Investment should be judged by the services and capabilities it sustains, not merely its execution rate.
Decentralisation also requires democratic accountability. Research in Cuzco has highlighted how civil society organisations can influence priorities and hold local authorities accountable. Their effectiveness varies, and local elites may capture participatory processes. Nevertheless, civic engagement and independent scrutiny offer possibilities that technical supervision alone cannot provide.
The alternative to weak local government should not be permanent dependence on decisions made elsewhere. Joint implementation with ministries, municipalities and companies can help, provided local authorities acquire rather than surrender governing capacities. Obras por Impuestos may deliver infrastructure but cannot replace democratic priority-setting.
A more ambitious reform would combine national standards for essential services with locally negotiated priorities, stronger administrative capacities, transparent monitoring and mechanisms for saving mineral revenues. It should also address inequalities between producing and non-producing territories. Such reform is more demanding than tightening expenditure rules but addresses the institutional conditions behind the canon’s disappointing performance.
The failure of the canon cannot be measured solely in money unspent or projects unfinished. It must also be measured in opportunities lost to build capable institutions, diversified economies and stronger relationships between citizens and the state. The real test is not how much of the canon is spent during a mining boom, but how much lasting development remains when the boom is over.
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