In the past weeks we have presented the profiles of George Forsyth, Julio Guzmán, Verónika Mendoza and Yonhy Lescano, and their respective parties. This week we discuss Keiko Fujimori and Fuerza Popular (FP).

Keiko Fujimori is the daughter and political heir of Alberto Fujimori, Peru’s authoritarian ruler of the 1990s who is now in prison for corruption and crimes against humanity. Keiko’s political career began when she replaced her mother as First Lady following her parents’ marital rift. She was elected to Congress in 2006 on a fujimorista ticket. In the next election, in 2011, she was a presidential candidate, narrowly defeated on the second round by Ollanta Humala. Again in 2016 she campaigned for the presidency but was similarly narrowly defeated by Pedro Pablo Kuczynski on the second round.

A salient feature of her political career has been the changing ways she has dealt with her father’s legacy. Having replaced Susana Higuchi as First Lady after Higuchi had denounced Fujimori`s corruption and the personal abuse she had received, Keiko blocked her father’s presidential pardon because she thought he would challenge her leadership of the fujimorista party. While she had campaigned in 2011 by celebrating her father`s achievements in office, she then distanced herself from his legacy, breaking with the fujimorista old guard in 2016. Then she saw to it that her brother Kenji was ejected from Congress because he negotiated a pardon with Kuczynski.

These days she is reconciled with the old guard, once again appealing to her father´s legacy and promising the same sort of authoritarian approach that he stood for in the 1990s. She is branding herself as the ‘mano dura’ in response to crime and the sense of insecurity among many voters.

If in 2011 and 2016, she made it to the second electoral round and then lost by the narrowest of margins, she is doing less well in her third shot at the presidency. According to recent Ipsos polls, the proportion of people who say they will vote for her is stuck (along with those supporting Verónika Mendoza and Daniel Urresti) at between 7% and 8%, while those who say they would never vote for her is higher than for most other candidates. In a simulated second round, she would lose irrespective of her opponent.

There are three reasons for this decline in her popularity since 2016.

  • Her refusal to accept defeat that year and FP’s behaviour in continually obstructing the executive in governing (both under Kuczynski and then under Martín Vizcarra since 2018) whilst openly shielding corruption.
  • Her having spent many months in jail on charges that she fiddled her election expenses in 2016 to disguise contributions from the Brazilian construction giant, Odebrecht and other major business interests.
  • The emergence of other candidates who compete with her in defending neoliberal policies and conservative values, such as Hernando de Soto and Rafael Lopez Aliaga. With between 3% and 4% of vote intentions each, these threaten to deprive Fujimori of the votes she would need to reach the second round.

A broader question is that of her fate and that of fujimorismo if she fails in this third bid for the presidency. Would this be the end of her political career? Would it mean that it is Kenji´s turn to take the lead? Or will it spell the end of fujimorismo as a political project?