By Fernando Tuesta
The approval of delegated powers – achieved in a contentious and haphazard manner – has left behind serious problems. Those who defined the Senate’s legislative functions have prevailed. The path forward has been set by the sheer force of votes, rather than through the balance required in a bicameral parliament.
This is not an isolated incident. For the past decade, a political practice has taken root: decisions are designed and pushed through by leveraging of a parliamentary majority. This is precisely what concerned Alexis de Tocqueville, John Adams, and John Stuart Mill when they warned against the “tyranny of the majority.” While having the votes makes it possible to pass measures, it does not automatically render every decision legitimate; nor does it absolve those in power from the obligation to respect the limits of their authority.
The current government came to power with a margin of less than one percent – it actually lost in the national popular vote. Its parliamentary strength, however, is not reflected equally across both chambers; it enjoys a more favourable position in the Senate than in the Chamber of Deputies. Yet this seems to be of little consequence. As has been the case in recent years, majorities are assembled to push through not only reasonable measures but also decisions whose constitutionality is, at the very least, open to debate.
Parliaments emerged as a vital mechanism for curbing absolute power. A system of checks and balances is intended to prevent a single majority – regardless of how legitimate its electoral mandate may be – from monopolising decision-making. Institutions must distribute authority and compel negotiation. Without such counterweights, democracy is reduced to nothing more than a tally of votes.
According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), as of the end of 2024 there were 190 national parliaments: 79 bicameral and 111 unicameral. While a two-chamber structure is common – especially in democracies – it does not, in itself, guarantee balance. There are democracies with a single chamber, just as there are authoritarian regimes with two. Ultimately, what matters is the function each chamber serves and how power is distributed between them.
In Latin America, this comparison is particularly relevant. The region’s bicameral systems operate within presidential regimes, and in none of the cases examined can the Senate unilaterally impose its own version of a bill already passed by the lower house. In Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, any modifications must return to the originating chamber, which may either accept them or – by securing specific majorities – insist on its original proposal. In Chile and Colombia, the process involves joint or conciliation committees. In Bolivia and Uruguay, disagreements can be resolved through a joint session of both chambers. While procedures vary, a common rule applies: a disagreement must involve both chambers; neither can conclude the legislative deliberation process on its own.
The Peruvian model departs from this logic. The reform that reinstated the Senate was driven by a parliament in which the current ruling coalition and its allies held a decisive position. That Congress sought to preserve and expand the power of the legislative branch vis-à-vis the executive and, within the parliament itself, to grant the Senate a position of superiority. It was not merely a matter of restoring an institution, but of designing it to serve the political interests of those who championed the reform.
The imbalance is clear. The Chamber of Deputies holds the power of legislative initiative and exercises political oversight over the government. The Senate, in addition to its appointment and oversight powers, may approve, amend, or reject bills received from the Chamber of Deputies. If it amends a bill, it is not required to return it to the originating chamber for further consideration; instead, it can send the final text directly to the executive for ratification. Consequently, the Chamber of Deputies loses any opportunity to weigh in on the changes introduced by the other chamber.
Furthermore, the handling of delegated powers has pushed this design even further. The Senate has not limited itself to amending the text approved by the Chamber of Deputies; it has incorporated entirely new subject matter – provisions that the lower house never approved – by relying on an overly broad interpretation of the term “amend.” Correcting or altering existing provisions within a bill is one thing, this is quite another. Another approach is to use this authority to introduce matters that did not receive approval from the originating chamber. In such cases, the power to amend ceases to be a mechanism for review and instead becomes a means to supplant the decision made by the Chamber of Deputies.
The consequence is clear: the Senate can alter a bill, incorporate new subject matter, and send it to the executive branch without any further involvement from the originating chamber. The Chamber of Deputies thus loses its distinct legislative function; its initial approval serves merely as a starting point for a decision made by another body.
Nor does Peruvian constitutional history offer a precedent for this arrangement. Eight of our twelve republican constitutions established a bicameral system. Since 1828, bills approved by one chamber were sent to the other for review; however, any disagreements were addressed through procedures for reconsideration or joint resolution. In 1856 and 1860, provision was made for a joint session of both chambers to resolve disagreements. The 1933 Constitution established that any modifications or rejections by the reviewing chamber should be returned to the originating chamber, with any persistent disagreements to be resolved by Congress as a whole. The constitutions of 1920 and 1979 were more precise: each chamber could insist upon its position, provided it secured the support of two-thirds of its members. If both chambers reached this threshold, no law could be enacted; neither chamber held the final word on its own.
Two problems arise here. First, a structural design that places the Senate in a position of superiority; and second, the exploitation of this advantage to expand the Senate’s powers well beyond what could reasonably be defined as “modifying” legislation. The delegation of powers illustrates the extent of this interpretation. In such cases, a disagreement between the chambers is not resolved; rather, the will of one is simply imposed upon the other.
Those who hold such majorities often forget that power is not permanent. A shift in political control could place others in the same position, allowing them to return – with equal force – the very decisions currently being imposed. Democracy is not merely about having the votes to do whatever one pleases; it also entails accepting limits when one is in power. Otherwise, the “tyranny of the majority” transforms parliament into precisely what it was intended to prevent: a power without checks and balances.
Published in La República on 1 November. Our translation. Fernando Tuesta is a former head of the ONPE and teaches in the Pontificia Universidad Pontificia del Perú.
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