The Executive’s proposed Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM) Law, Ley MAPE, has prompted a range of reactions, criticisms, and proposals to amend or expand its provisions. The intensity of the debate reflects a deeply entrenched problem. Beneath these competing arguments lies a complex web of economic interests, social realities, institutional weaknesses, and territorial tensions that defy simple solutions. The debate risks obscuring a fundamental question: Are we creating the conditions for small-scale mining to operate legally, or merely designing a new procedure for managing informality?
The proposed law offers some promising changes: moving beyond the REINFO’s repeatedly extended exceptional regime toward a permanent regulatory framework, simplifying procedures, facilitating agreements between concession holders and small-scale miners, strengthening traceability, and establishing a specialised agency, FORMAPE. These are relevant measures, several of which reflect longstanding recommendations. But let us be clear: their effectiveness will depend less on the rules themselves than on the conditions under which they can be implemented and sustained.
Those conditions begin with recognising that ASM is far from a homogeneous activity. It encompasses producers operating legally, others actively seeking formalisation, those whose progress is stalled by structural barriers, and opportunistic operators who exploit regulatory weaknesses. Between informal and illegal mining lies a porous boundary, where limited access to formal financing, services, and markets can create dependencies on illicit networks. Criminal organisations exploit these vulnerabilities through coercion, territorial control, or commercial arrangements, while other actors knowingly collaborate with them.
Not all illegal mining involves organised crime, just as formal status does not necessarily guarantee responsible environmental, labour, or social performance. These distinctions call for differentiated responses that help producers move toward formalisation while reducing their exposure to illegal and criminal economies.
The differences between these actors cannot be understood independently of the structures within which they operate. Informality is not simply the result of cumbersome procedures. It is shaped by the distribution of mining rights, access to land, relationships between concession holders and producers, the role of intermediaries and processing facilities, and access to formal markets. These arrangements involve significant economic and power asymmetries. Changing administrative requirements without addressing these conditions may simplify formalisation on paper while leaving its underlying obstacles intact.
Facilitating exploitation agreements, for example, is a step forward, but it does not guarantee that agreements will be reached. Incentives, mediation, trust, and viable business arrangements are equally necessary. Experiences of coexistence between mining companies and small-scale producers show that technical assistance, financing, occupational safety, and access to responsible markets help make such arrangements viable. There is no universally replicable model, but the underlying lesson is clear: formalisation becomes sustainable when it offers better economic and social opportunities than informality.
The institutional dimension is inseparable from these economic relationships. ASM governance encompasses environmental management, labour, taxation, security, justice, community rights, and territorial governance. A uniform approach cannot adequately address the different productive, social, and environmental realities of Peru’s mining territories. A specialised agency may improve coordination, but it cannot, on its own, resolve problems extending well beyond the remit of the Ministry of Energy and Mines.
This raises a particularly troubling inconsistency. The bill’s explanatory memorandum (Exposición de motivos) states that implementation will entail no additional expenditure from the national treasury. Effective institutions, interoperable information systems, technical assistance, and territorial oversight require specialised personnel, funding, and continuity. Previous formalisation efforts repeatedly established new requirements and extended deadlines without adequately addressing the economic barriers to compliance or building the institutional capacities needed to overcome them. There is little reason to expect fundamentally different outcomes if these structural and institutional shortcomings remain unaddressed.
A systemic reform strategy must therefore advance on several fronts simultaneously. Producers need viable pathways to formalisation, including access to mining rights, financing, technology, and responsible markets. Traceability must extend through processing plants and commercial networks. In parallel, financial intelligence, criminal investigations, and territorial control must be strengthened to confront criminal networks. These efforts require sustained institutional investment, as the economic and governance conditions that reproduce informality cannot be transformed through isolated or temporary interventions.
These changes cannot be achieved by the state alone. Large-scale mining companies, processing plants, buyers, financial institutions, communities, and small-scale miners’ organisations all shape the conditions under which formalisation can succeed. Their responsibilities differ, but traceability and due diligence must extend throughout the value chain rather than being concentrated on its smallest and most vulnerable participants.
The challenge is not simply to pursue formalisation and combat criminal economies simultaneously, but to ensure that the two efforts reinforce rather than undermine each other. Formalisation policies that fail to offer viable economic alternatives risk leaving producers dependent on illicit networks. Enforcement strategies that fail to distinguish between vulnerable producers and criminal organisations may, in turn, undermine the very conditions needed for formalisation. Effective policy requires both differentiation and coordination, grounded in an understanding of the economic and territorial relationships that connect these actors.
The proposed law may be an important step, but the instrument should not be mistaken for the solution. Small-scale mining will continue to expand, driven by economic and social forces that extend beyond legislation. The challenge is to create the conditions for that growth to take place legally and responsibly, while preventing criminal economies from exploiting gaps in state presence and enforcement. Without the resources, institutional capacities and structural reforms needed to sustain it, the law risks becoming another means of postponing decisions that grow more difficult and more costly the longer they remain unresolved.
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