The latest changes at the top of Petroperú has predictably reopened an old argument: supporters of the state oil company warn that restructuring could become privatisation by another name; its critics point to years of losses, government support and accumulated debt as evidence that the state should withdraw.

The choices over Petroperú have become more complicated in recent times. Its operations have improved significantly in 2026. The Talara refinery is operating more consistently, costs have been reduced, and the company has benefited from stronger refining margins and better results from the oil blocks in production. Favourable international market conditions have also contributed.

However, better operations have not eliminated Petroperú’s severe liquidity constraints or its large, accumulated debt, and are unlikely to do so on their own. A few profitable months do not demonstrate that the existing model is sustainable. Neither should the company’s financial problems prevent Peru from asking whether some of the assets it owns can generate meaningful economic value.

Talara brings that question into focus. Building the refinery is no longer an issue; it has been done, albeit at enormous cost. Should Talara now be treated primarily as an industrial asset, expected to operate efficiently, secure appropriate supplies of crude and generate a competitive return? Or does its value also lie in functions that may not appear in its financial results, including energy security and maintaining a national refining capacity?

If the latter is the case, further questions arise. How much are those functions worth? Who should pay for them? And which of them presuppose state ownership or management? Conversely, if private expertise, financing or partnerships could improve Talara’s performance without compromising strategic objectives, there is little reason to exclude them on doctrinal grounds.

The same questions may be asked of Petroperú more broadly. The company refines and sells fuels, owns strategic infrastructure, operates the Northern Peruvian Pipeline, participates in oil production and contributes to supplying parts of the country where purely commercial considerations may not always be sufficient. These functions need not all be organised, financed or managed in the same way. Nor should they all be expected to produce the same kind of return. While some activities may have to demonstrate commercial viability, others may be worth maintaining because they serve strategic, territorial or even political objectives.

Ensuring fuel supply in remote areas, maintaining critical infrastructure or preserving capabilities considered important for national energy security may carry costs that a government deliberately chooses to bear. The issue is not to disguise those costs as commercial losses, but to identify them, justify them as strategic and decide transparently how they should be financed.

The restructuring already underway offers an opportunity to make such distinctions. The Fujimori government is considering different arrangements for groups of Petroperú assets, potentially involving private investment or management while retaining overall public ownership. The debate should therefore move beyond whether this constitutes privatisation and to ask what Peru is trying to achieve in each case.

Commercial activities should be able to demonstrate that they generate value. But beyond that, the questions become less straightforward. Does commercial viability require private ownership or management? Does public ownership necessarily make an activity strategic? Which capabilities does Peru need to retain, and which of them require Petroperú to own or operate the assets involved?