Fifty years ago, Peru refined a much larger share of its mineral production than it does today. Valuable by-products contained in copper, zinc and lead concentrates are now often recovered by refiners overseas. A recent CooperAcción article, drawing on International Energy Agency (IEA) data and an earlier CooperAccion study, argues that Peru receives little or no payment for some of these elements. The point is important, but recovery also depends on concentration, technology, contracts and costs. Peru lacks the information and policy tools needed to know what is leaving and who captures the value.
The IEA reports exceptionally strong price growth since January 2023 for strategic minor minerals such as antimony, bismuth, gallium, germanium, indium, tantalum, tellurium, titanium and tungsten. These elements are used in defence, aerospace, semiconductors and clean-energy technologies. They are not the same as rare earths, which are a specific group of 17 elements.
It is difficult to estimate how much Peru is losing out and the presence of a trace element in a concentrate does not mean that it can be recovered profitably. Also, building a domestic refinery does not automatically create value. Peru’s limited refining capacity and the environmental history of La Oroya show that processing decisions must be based on economics, technology and environmental safeguards, not simply on ideas of resource nationalism.
A distinction also needs to be drawn between minerals currently produced from future potential. Peru already produces copper, zinc, silver, lead, tin, molybdenum, iron and phosphates. Some strategic elements may be recovered as by-products, although public statistics on this are uneven. Lithium and rare earths, by contrast, are not yet in commercial production; they belong to the category of prospective resources.
Peru has not been wholly inactive on critical minerals. It was a founding partner of the US-led Energy Resource Governance Initiative in 2019. It later signed critical-minerals agreements with the United States in 2024 and 2026, with South Korea in 2024, Chile in 2025 and Canada in 2026. These agreements were designed to promote investment and resilient supply chains; the 2026 U.S. agreement also covers technology, processing, recycling, mapping, research and human capital. Yet they were essentially diplomatic initiatives to attract investment, not products of overall national policy.
The country still lacks an official national list of critical minerals and, with the exception of a 2021 law on lithium, a comprehensive strategy to develop them. Three practical steps would help: (a) requiring consistent assays and declarations of commercially relevant elements; (b) the strengthening of SUNAT, customs and independent laboratory capacity; and (c) identification of a few viable opportunities for local recovery, research and processing. Not all critical minerals minerals can realistically be refined in Peru.
Peru needs to go beyond the diplomacy to attract foreign investment into gaining a better grasp of the potential for developing critical minerals, based on information, proper valuation and an understanding of the domestic capabilities.
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