The new National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States substantially redefines the economic relationship with Latin America. The Western Hemisphere ceases to be merely a space for trade and investment, becoming instead a strategic platform directly linked to US economic security. In this new framework, capital flows, logistical infrastructure, critical minerals, and energy are treated as security assets, not as development variables. Peru will not escape its implications.
Unlike previous strategies, which focused on governance and broad economic cooperation, the 2025 NSS adopts an explicitly competitive approach. The United States seeks to reduce its dependence on Asia, ensure the supply of strategic inputs, and limit the influence of extra-hemispheric actors (primarily China) in sectors considered “sensitive”. Economic logic is thus subordinated to objectives of resilience, control, and geoeconomic positioning.
In this context, the concept of nearshoring acquires a particular meaning. It is not just about attracting investment or shortening supply chains for efficiency reasons, but about relocating strategic risks. Latin America is seen as a space to secure critical minerals, energy, port infrastructure, and logistics corridors under politically reliable conditions for Washington.
For countries like Peru, Chile and Brazil, this logic is central. For the NSS, its relevance lies not primarily in the issue of migration, but in the weight these countries carry in copper, lithium, energy, ports, and logistics hubs. In this context, Peru, in particular, combines a prominent position as a major copper producer with increasingly important port infrastructure on the Pacific coast, including the port of Chancay. These assets are not ends in themselves, but instruments for reconfiguring global supply chains and reducing US strategic exposure.
The strategy does not offer a classic productive development program. The investment promoted is selective, conditional, and geared toward specific objectives: security of supply, control of bottlenecks, and the relative and gradual displacement of Chinese capital in critical sectors. The implicit message is clear: access to financing, technology, and markets will be increasingly linked to strategic decisions and functional alignments.
Ports aptly illustrate this tension. Key logistics infrastructure is evaluated not only for its profitability but also for who finances it, who operates it, and under what technological and data management standards it operates. Here the NSS introduces a logic of direct competition with China, whose investments in ports, energy, and mining are increasingly problematised as strategic risks for the US.
For medium-sized economies like Peru, the challenge is complex. On the one hand, there is a real opportunity to attract investment linked to nearshoring, the energy transition, and critical minerals. On the other, the risk of extreme bilateralisation increases: country-by-country negotiations, with less capacity to set conditions and greater dependence on a single dominant partner.
Mexico exemplifies the extreme of this logic. It is a key country for the United States not only because of immigration but also because of its central role in the reconfiguration of US industry. But even for Mexico, the relationship is profoundly transactional: cooperation in exchange for concrete economic benefits, with recurring tensions and limited margins for strategic autonomy.
For Peru and other Andean countries, the risk is not being left out of this strategy but being trapped within it, with little negotiating power. Acting in isolation reduces the ability to set standards, diversify partners, and protect long-term national interests. Subregional coordination in mining, energy, logistics, and regulation should not be an ideological project, but a defensive economic tool against a strategy that prioritises immediate results over balanced development.
The 2025 National Security Strategy should thus be read less as a promise of economic integration and more as a framework for competitive management of the hemisphere, where access to investment, technology, and markets will increasingly be conditioned by security criteria and strategic alignment. For Latin America, and for Peru in particular, the challenge is not to attract capital at any cost, but to transform its resource endowment, infrastructure, and logistical position into effective negotiating power, productive leverage, and a margin of autonomy. In a hemispheric economy defined by security, natural resources cease to be an advantage in themselves; only strategy and coordination turn them into real power.
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