In a historic reversal of fortunes and less than a week after it was appointed, the Merino presidency was hanging by a hair as we went to press. Almost the whole cabinet had presented its resignation following the deaths of two or perhaps three protesters in a night of street demonstrations on 14 November against what most observers are now calling a coup d’etat.
Previously on 12 November, an estimated 15,000 people came from all over the capital to register their repudiation of the assumption of power by Manuel Merino after the impeachment of President Martín Vizcarra. On both nights, the police moved in with tear gas causing mayhem in what were otherwise peaceful rallies. Several people were wounded. Demonstrations have also taken place in cities and towns all over Peru, as well as in a number of foreign countries.
On the evening of 14 November practically the whole cabinet tendered their resignation, aware that the Merino administration lacked the political support to make it viable. Merino’s resignation appeared to be just a matter of time. His assumption of the presidency on 9 November sparked outrage at home and abroad.
Foreign response
Even the Organization of American States issued a critical statement with respect to Merino’s use of the 1993 constitution to oust Vizcarra for supposed “permanent moral incapacity”. It said it would await the Constitutional Tribunal ruling on the matter. A meeting of the tribunal was pending on whether the pretext by which Vizcarra had been ousted was constitutionally valid.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights echoed this view, as did the government of Colombia. Human Rights Watch in Washington suggested that the OAS should urgently convene a meeting of its Permanent Council to discuss the situation in Peru.
In a statement, the British Embassy in Lima said it too awaited the verdict of the Constitutional Tribunal and criticised the use of excessive police violence in dealing with demonstrations.
With the anger on the streets growing, hostility amid growing sectors of public opinion, a very cool reception abroad, and growing concern in international financial markets, Merinos’s government looked precarious indeed. Tellingly, as he left Government Palace on 9 November, Vizcarra said that it was an administration that lacks both legitimacy and legality.
Who will take over if Merino goes remains an open question. The newly appointed president of Congress, who comes from the Alianza par el Progreso (APP), a party which supported Vizcarra’s impeachment, is unlikely to meet with public approval. Constitutionally, it is he who would be in the line of succession given the fact that there are currently no vice-presidents.
Merino’s cabinet
The new cabinet, announced on 12 November, was characterised by its right-wing leanings. The prime minister, Atenor Flores-Aráoz, appointed by Merino two days before, is an old-style conservative who entered politics as a militant of the Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC). He was defence minister under Alan García’s government at the time of the Bagua killings in 2009. His law firm defends Telesup, one of the private universities denied certification by the regulatory authority, Sinedu. Telesup is owned by the Luna family which runs Podemos Perú, one of the parties that orchestrated Vizcarra’s impeachment. Commenting on the situation, Flores-Aráuz is quoted as saying that “if Merino goes, so will I”.
Notable was the appointment of retired vice-admiral Fernando D’Alessio as education minister who, as health minister under the Kuczynski government, played a key role in the attempt to offer a pardon to Alberto Fujimori. He is quoted as saying, absurdly, that the marches that have taken place over recent days were organised by Movadef, the support organisation of Sendero Luminoso.
The new finance minister was José Arista who previously worked as a consultant on financial services at the Andean Development Corporation (CAF). He was previously governor of Amazonas region (2011-14) and, in this capacity, faced accusations of corruption. Retired army general Jorge Chávez was appointed minister of defence and retired police general Gastón Rodríguez minister of the interior (and responsible for the police). Equally importantly, given the Covid-19 pandemic, Abel Salinas was appointed minister of health. The highly qualified Pilar Mazzetti had refused the invitation to carry on in the post.
Of particular interest to PSG concerns was the appointment as Carlos Herrera Descalzi as minister of energy and mines. He was previously minister in 2011 who recently expressed his rejection of the Escazú Agreement. The new environment minister was Lizzet Rojas who, three months back, was turned down as lacking aptitude for public sector employment and who lacked any experience in the environmental field.
Vizcarra’s ouster
The scale of the congressional support for Vizcarra’s impeachment – 105 in favour and 19 against – took most by surprise. Even shortly before the vote, it seemed unlikely that the necessary 87 votes in favour would be forthcoming. Key to the outcome was the volte-face by APP, the party led by private university magnate César Acuña. Lobbyists for the private universities have long fought to ditch the government’s programme to improve higher education by withdrawing registration from several universities with particularly bad academic standards.
More broadly, as we have pointed out many times over the last year or so, members of Congress have bitterly opposed Vizcarra’s attempts to introduce reforms to the political and electoral systems. One of their major bugbears was the changes to the regime of parliamentary immunity from prosecution. Many members of Congress face accusations of corrupt activity, for which immunity provides a crucial shield.
As readers will recall, the pretext for impeachment was the allegation that Vizcarra received bribes in his capacity as governor of Moquegua between 2011 and 2014. Not only have these allegations – which may or may not be true – never been proven but have yet to be investigated by the public prosecutor’s office. They are based on testimony by witnesses seeking to reduce the penalties levelled against them by providing evidence under plea-bargaining procedures.
An immediate issue arising from what has been widely referred to as a ‘parliamentary coup’ is the status of the Constitutional Tribunal, which has the last word in defining the constitution. As impeachment proceedings were launched against Vizcarra, the tribunal was being called upon to define what is meant by the phrase “permanent moral incapacity”. Many constitutional specialists argue that it was introduced in the 1993 constitution simply to remove a president mentally incapable of continuing in the role and that its use to remove Vizcarra was wholly inappropriate.
Congress has it in its power to elect new members to the tribunal which, previously, had ruled unconstitutional a number of legislative initiatives emanating from its ranks.
On taking office, Merino had promised to adhere to the election timetable and to hand over power to a new elected president on 28 July next year. The fate of next year’s elections is uncertain, but any attempt to postpone them will further ignite public anger. Assuming they do take place on 11 April, it seems likely that they will benefit those parties and candidates who clearly opposed Merino’s takeover of office.
Merino, formerly the president of Congress, only became president by virtue of the fact that Vizcarra had no vice-presidents. He had previously been first vice-president to Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (whom he replaced in March 2018) and the second vice-president elected in 2016, Mercedes Aráoz, resigned earlier this year.
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