Chinese demand and Chinese investment have been the driving forces of Peru’s expansion in the first decade of the new century, and the impetus has been focused on mining and petroleum. Chinese firms hold some 30% of Peru’s mining portfolio, and Peru is the chief location for Chinese investment in the mineral sector in Latin America. Chinese firms’ entry into the sector has tended to be regarded with some suspicion, given their inexperience in Latin America, the differences of culture, and the fragility associated with community relations and environmental threats.

It is therefore important to pay attention to a major report just published, entitled ‘China and Latin America: Lessons for South-South Cooperation and Sustainable Development’. The report is based on careful research with many detailed case studies about the behaviour of specific firms. It concludes that while the commodity boom itself has accentuated environmental degradation and social conflict, notably in Peru, individual Chinese firms have behaved in diverse manners, but on the whole no worse than any other large firm operating in the sector in Latin America. In fact, the Peru chapter argues, Chinese firms have shown both a propensity and a desire to learn. An early disaster which caused huge conflict – Shougang’s importing of Chinese workers to Hierro Perú – taught later entrants not to bring in Chinese workers. A serious case of environmental damage, an acid-water spill at the Chinese-run Toromocho mine, led to closure on the orders of the regulator, but the problem was remedied in a few days. And after the incident, the Association of Chinese Companies in Peru asked the Ministry of the Environment for training on local environmental regulations.

Chinese firms have also begun – slowly – to participate in efforts at multi-stakeholder dialogue, says the report. The need to communicate and negotiate with a large number of actors after winning a concession – including municipal authorities and indigenous communities – is not something the Chinese are used to. It claims that ‘Chinese businesspeople and diplomats may be less experienced at multi-stakeholder relations than their western counterparts, and less accustomed to demands for accountability from non-state actors’ (p12). But they are learning, notably in the case of Chinalco in Morococha and Shougang in Marcona (p27). Likewise in respect of transparency, some Chinese firms have recently joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) on reporting taxes and profits.

These findings are solidly based. The aspect of the report which is more questionable is its portrayal of Peru as a ‘leader’ in environmental and transparency regulation and reporting. It praises Peru for being the first in Latin America to join the EITI in 2007 and for legislation to implement the ILO Convention 169 on the right of prior consultation. But we note that, so far, the practice has excluded the indigenous communities of the highlands and the coast.

The report, available at http://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2015/04/Working-Group-Final-Report-Pages1.pdf, has been written by four research groups: the Global Economic Governance Initiative, Boston University (GEGI); the Centro de Investigaciones de la Universidad del Pacífico, Lima (CIUP); Centro de Investigaciones para la Transformación, Buenos Aires; and the Global Development and Environment Initiative, Tufts University. The main authors are Rebecca Ray, Kevin P. Gallagher, Andrés López and Cynthia Sanborn. The chapter on Peru is authored by Cynthia Sanborn and Victoria Chonn and entitled ‘Chinese Investment in Peru’s Mining Industry: Blessing or Curse’.