Corruption has never been far from the surface of Peruvian politics, but with the October local elections approaching, the scale of corruption has become depressingly clear in sub-national levels of government throughout much of the country. Regional governments in as many as 19 of Peru’s 25 regions are under investigation for corruption. People’s faith in decentralised governance – designed to deepen democracy in the country – appears to have fallen to an all-time low.

Part of the problem lies in the haphazard way in which decentralisation came about in Peru. This was conceived of as a way of reversing excessive centralisation after the collapse of the authoritarian Fujimori regime in 2000. Under the governments of Valentín Paniagua (2000-01) and Alejandro Toledo (2001-06), a system of regional administration was introduced with mechanisms designed to enhance the degree of participation and oversight by civil society over the activities of local government – regional, provincial and district.

The degree of success of such participatory arrangements was, at best, very patchy; these worked best where civil society was well-organised and able to take up the challenge, or where regional presidents and local mayors were keen to promote such involvement. But there was always a wider problem. Decentralising to local administrations that lacked the capacity to manage the responsibilities allotted to them (and the financial transfers which went with these) was bound to be problematic. Since Peru has always been highly centralised, these capacities had never developed properly, and devolving power to local administration was a risky venture.

This was made more so by the lack of adequate institutions to oversee the process of decentralisation and iron out the sort of problems that would emerge. The National Decentralisation Council (CND), instituted by Toledo, lacked the power to undertake the task, and was then summarily abolished by his successor, President Alan García (2006-11), whose commitment to decentralised governance was at best half-hearted.

The problem was made far worse by the canon system of fiscal transfers, introduced alongside decentralisation in the early years of the decade, by which taxes paid by extractive industries (basically mining and hydrocarbons) were passed on to local government to fund infrastructural investments. This was seen at the time as a way of ensuring that the income from extractive industries (or at least part of it) was returned to those areas which had generated tax revenues in the first place. As such, the system was designed to pacify growing localised opposition to such industries, especially in the Andean and Amazonian parts of the country.

As commodity prices — especially for minerals – rose during these years, so too did the flows of cash pouring into decentralised coffers. Huge disparities emerged between the canon received by resource-rich regions and municipalities, and those that had few resources. Regions such as Cusco, which benefitted from the burgeoning gas revenues from Camisea, had more money than they could properly spend, whilst others – such as neighbouring Madre de Dios – received practically no canon money.

Not for nothing, then, that those regions with large extractive industries have been those which have come under growing scrutiny for the corrupt use of funds: Cusco, Ancash, Ayacucho, Cajamarca etc. However, it will be difficult to overhaul the whole system of transfers to sub-national government without calling into question the principle of decentralisation and unleashing bitter opposition at the regional level and below, to what will be seen to be the attempt by Lima to claw back lost powers and reassert time-honoured centralised governance. Local campaigns for the October elections are therefore likely to focus on the defence of devolved government in opposition to centralised administration from Lima.

The Humala government has responded to the wave of corruption allegations – mostly, as yet, unproven – by coming up with a package of reforms to local governance. These include, for instance, measures that would prevent incumbent regional presidents standing for successive re-election. Other measures would seek to beef up centralised oversight of the use made by fiscal transfers to sub-national government.

Meanwhile, the issue of corruption is also likely to be the leitmotiv of the municipal elections in Lima itself, where a third of the electorate resides. These are quite likely to be a fierce battle between the incumbent mayor of Lima, Susana Villarán, and her immediate predecessor, Luis Castañeda Lossio. Villarán, a centre-left politician who narrowly survived the attempt to unseat her last year (orchestrated by Castañeda), has sought to defend her reputation for clean government. However Castañeda, whose honesty has been widely questioned, has a strong popular following – in part due to the scale of spending during his term in office. He enjoys strong support from Lima’s right-wing press which has consistently questioned Villarán’s efficacy as mayor. Recent opinion polls have consistently been in his favour.